The Board acknowledges that the pool of SSI recipients with substantial work capacity is limited, but believes that SSI should be structured in a way that supports and incentivizes work attempts. In this Statement, the Board considers the employment outcomes of the working-age SSI population, current SSI work incentives, and how the program could better move non-working recipients into employment.
The provisions currently in place to aid recipients’ transition into the workforce could be improved. Shifting SSI policymaking to the states might allow them to experiment with and likely improve eligibility rules, benefit formulas, and work supports. A significantly lower initial benefit reduction rate would provide an incentive to get non-workers into a job. Congress could also create work expectations for those recipients most likely to be able to work, either by requiring work or by reducing benefits for recipients deemed most able and likely to work. However, the Board noted that compulsory work for people whose eligibility for SSI was based on an inability to perform substantial gainful activity is potentially cruel to recipients. The Board also cautioned decisionmakers to be mindful of how any changes would make SSA’s administration of the SSI program more burdensome, inaccurate, or expensive.
The Statement is included in SSA’s 2017 Annual Report on the SSI Program. The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Act of 1996 gives Board members the opportunity, individually or jointly, to include their views on SSI in SSA’s annual report to the President and Congress on the Supplemental Security Income (SSI) program. The Board or one of its members has submitted a statement every year since 1998, except for 2024 due to the lack of a quorum.